Introduction
On 14 October 2014 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided that the EU has exclusive competence to accept the accession of a non-EU State to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980. The Court's judgment coincides with the views of Advocate General Jääskinen, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Italian Government. The French, Greek and Polish Governments argued before the Court that the EU has no external competence in this matter whilst 16 Governments (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and the Council argued that that the EU does not have exclusive external competence in this matter.
Given the weight of advice to the Court against exclusive external competence it is reasonable to expect a carefully reasoned opinion from the Court justifying its "minority" decision. Sadly the Court fails to meet this legitimate expectation. On the question of the existence of EU competence the Court devotes two paragraphs of its Opinion.1 F
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The Court does not properly set out the criteria for external competence found in Article 216 TFEU and it does not clarify under which aspect of Article 216(1)TFEU the competence arises. It does not have the courtesy to set out, far less address, the arguments of France, Greece and Poland as to why the EU has no external competence. In relation to exclusive external competence the Court does at least set out the three criteria in Article 3(2) TFEU and makes it clear that the case turns on the third criterion: whether the acceptance of third State accessions to the Hague Child Abduction Convention "may affect common rules [of EU law] or alter their scope".2 F 2 However, the Court fails to give reasons as to why its pre-Lisbon case law on "largely covered area" and "foreseeable future developments" is still relevant to determining this third criteria now that the Treaty (since Lisbon) defines exclusive external competence rather than the matter being one that had purely and simply been created by the Court through its case law. The Court merely asserts that its earlier case law is still relevant.3 F 3 The continued relevance of these features of the Court's case law which are not codified in the TFEU is, in a technical sense, "unjustified" by the Court. Likewise in relation to the question of whether the Brussels IIa rules may be affected by the Member States declaring their acceptance of the accession of third States to the Child Abduction Convention the Court indulges in mere assertion that this is likely to happen with no evidence presented of how such acceptance of the accession of third States could possibly "affect" the application of Brussels IIa or alter its scope.4 F 4 This is despite the Court's continued rhetorical flourish (taken over from Opinion 1/03) that "since the EU has only conferred powers, any competence, especially where it is exclusive, must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the relationship between the envisaged international agreement and the EU law in force."5 F 5
Background to Opinion 1/13
The Brussels IIa Regulation entered into force on 1 August 2004. In practice it made it a prerequisite of its application that EU Member States be a party to the Hague Child Abduction Convention and therefore that Convention became part of the EU acquis. However, it did not incorporate the Convention into EU law in any classical sense of the word "incorporate". Others have highlighted concerns with the extent to which the CJEU is creating case law that may be ignored by national courts and to prevent this have suggested that the Court should pay more attention to young European Union law academics who are pro-European Union but feel the need to critique the Court when it seems to be going too far.1 0F 10 One very prominent pro-European Union law academic, Joseph Weiler, has warned the CJEU in surprisingly, but nonetheless welcome, cogent terms about the paucity of the reasoning in a number of important judgments and the tendency to interfere in the EU political process by effectively rewriting legislation. in the HS2 case has recently reminded the CJEU to pay more attention to the text of EU laws,1 4F 14 to "respect" the balance of interests inherent in the EU legislative structure which often leads to "objectives" not being fully achieved in legislation in order to reach political agreement1 5F 15 and thus:
"When reading or interpreting legislation, it can never therefore be assumed that particular objectives have been achieved to the fullest possible degree. Limitations on the scope or application of a legislative measure may have been necessary to achieve agreement. There may also have been good reasons for limitations, of which courts are unaware or are not the best to judge. Where the legislature has agreed a clearly expressed measure, reflecting the legislator's choices and compromises in order to achieve agreement, it is not for courts to rewrite the legislation, to extend or 'improve' it in respects which the legislator clearly did not intend."1 6F
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The UK Supreme Court warned the CJEU that failure to heed its advice will lead to a "loss of confidence at national level in European Union law"1 7F 17 which may impair the dialogue between national courts and the CJEU and risk States being reluctant to reach agreement on new legislation in the EU (or where relevant make it more likely that an EU State will exercise its right not to opt in to EU law -a point relevant for Denmark, Ireland and the UK in some areas, including private international law 
Opinion 1/13 -Admissibility
The Council and some Member States argued that the request for an opinion was inadmissible on a number of grounds. Two of these grounds merit analysis because of the Court's unclear reasoning or departure from the views of the Advocate General. by Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lord Wilson; Lord Sumption said at para 111 that he agreed with Lord Mance's "important reservations… about the relevance of EU law to questions of national citizenship"; and Lord Reed said at para 112 that there was "much" in the judgment of Lord Mance that he agreed with including his "observations about EU law and British nationality.".
The Council and some Member States argued that it was a misuse of the opinion procedure by the Commission to bring such a procedure after such a long delay when the Commission should instead have been bringing infringement proceedings under Article 258TFEU against those Member States who had declared their acceptances of third State accessions to the Hague Convention in violation of exclusive EU external competence. The Court of Justice said that it was not presented with any "specific and objective evidence which could lead it to conclude that, in making this request, the Commission has acted exclusively, or at the least primarily, with the aim of circumventing the procedure laid down in Article 258TFEU."2 0F 20 This quotation gives the impression that a "misuse of the opinion procedure" could be sustained if enough evidence were to be presented to the Court. The next paragraph of the Court's reasoning seems to refute this impression by saying that: "In any event" the fact that the Commission could bring Treaty infringement proceedings to give the Court the opportunity to address the same questions does not "preclude" the Commission from asking the Court to give an Article 218(11) Opinion.2 1F 21 This is very unsatisfactory reasoning. Either a misuse of the opinion procedure is possible (when the requisite amount of evidence is presented to the Court) on the basis that the Commission is evading bringing infringement proceedings or it is not. If it is not, the Court should not make spurious references to the amount of evidence presented before it. It should simply say it can never be a misuse of the opinion procedure when it is used as an alternative to bringing infringement proceedings. The fact that the Court has to act collegially in a single judgment can make it difficult for it to always produce logically coherent judgments, given internal disagreements among the judges as to the reasoning by which the majority decision is reached, but the collective responsibility of the Court is to ensure that it does.
b) The Agreement with third States is no longer "envisaged" as it has already taken place at least for some Member States
Article 218(11) TFEU requires that an agreement is "envisaged" when an Opinion from the Court is sought and this is made abundantly clear by the last sentence of the Article which says that: "Where the Opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged must not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised." The problem is that in this case a number of EU Member States had already accepted the accession to the Hague Abduction Convention of some or all of the 8 third States referred to in the Commission's proposals of December 2011. For those States the Hague Abduction Convention was already in force between those States and the relevant third States under public international law. Therefore the Council and some of the Member States argued that at least for those EU States the potential EU "agreement" to accept the accession of the relevant third States was no longer "envisaged" at the time of the request for an Opinion by the Commission and therefore was inadmissible. This was an argument that found favour with Advocate General Jääskinen.2 2F
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The Court, however, does not "engage" with this argument, or the View of the Advocate General on it, at all. Instead it resorts again to mere unreasoned assertion as follows: 2015) . For such an important topic (external competence of the EU) these preparatory resources from the failed constitutional convention and from the Lisbon IGC tell us practically nothing about the intentions of the drafters. This suggests a casualness on the part of the drafters that is deeply worrying from the point of view of EU Member States caring about and exercising their sovereign rights properly. "The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope." However, in the Court's Opinion 1/13 the Grand Chamber declines to start with Article 216 TFEU in determining whether the EU has competence to accept the accession of third States to the Hague Child Abduction Convention. In a clear assertion of its own case law transcending the Treaty it sets out the competence of the EU from its own case law2 5F 25 and then dismissively says:
"The last-mentioned possibility is also referred to in Article 216(1) TFEU."2 6F
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This is a small but vivid example of the Court thinking it is master of the Treaties rather than it being the servant of the Treaties. In the Court's view it would seem that the idea of conferred powers encompasses the notion of conferred by earlier case law of the Court of Justice.
So having partially stated the law on external competence based on its own case law in one paragraph the Court then applies the law to the case in the next paragraph saying that the Hague Convention:
"falls within the area of family law with cross-border implications in which the EU has internal competence under Article 81(3) TFEU. Moreover, the EU has exercised that competence by adopting Regulation 2201/2003. In those circumstances, the EU has external competence in the area which forms the subject matter of the Convention."2 7F
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So the Court asserts that the EU has external competence without clarifying on which basis of Article 216(1) TFEU the competence arises. The impression is that the Court thinks the EU has external competence whenever a matter falls within an area over which the EU has internal competence to legislate. However, this is not the test in Article 216(1) TFEU. Article 216(1) TFEU requires that the Treaty or a legally binding Union act must confer external competence (clearly not the case here), or that the external agreement is "likely to affect common rules or alter their scope" (not considered by the Court here but only later in relation to exclusive external competence), or that the "conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties" (but the Court does not discuss this either as it does not refer to 25 Opinion 1/13, para 67 -"The competence of the EU to conclude international agreements may arise not only from an express conferment by the Treaties but may equally flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaties and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the EU institutions. In particular, whenever EU law creates for those institutions powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the EU has authority to undertake international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision to that effect (Opinion 1/03, EU:C:2006:81, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited)." 26 Opinion 1/13, end of para 67. 27 Opinion 1/13, para 68.
an "objective" of the Treaty nor to whether declaring the acceptance of the accession of 3 rd States to the Hague Child Abduction Convention is "necessary" to achieve that objective2 8F
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).
Perhaps the reason that the Court does not allow Article 216(1) TFEU to govern its decision on whether the EU has external competence is that it would have to apply an even higher standard than in determining whether the EU has exclusive external competence under Article 3(2) TFEU. The only possible criterion that justifies, "under the Treaty", EU external competence to decide on the acceptance of 3 rd State accessions to the Hague Child Abduction Convention is that such an acceptance "is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope" (Article 216(1) TFEU) and not just that such an acceptance "may affect common rules or alter their scope".2 9F 29 A sensible construction of the Treaty is surely that exclusive external competence cannot arise unless there is external competence. Therefore the higher standard of "is likely to", rather than the lower standard of "may", affect should apply to both issues. Instead the Court of Justice runs away from such textual analysis of the Treaty. It does not replace the Treaty standard with a clear standard of its own which could readily be followed in subsequent cases. So the Court's approach is bad judicial activism in policy terms -a Court not acting within the powers conferred on it -and in process terms -a Court creating the law but not making it clear what the new law is.
The Court's standard for the existence of EU external competence may be simply that the external agreement falls within an area of internal EU competence whether or not that competence has been exercised internally (a very radical position) or it may be that external competence exists when the external agreement falls within an area of EU internal competence and the EU has already exercised "that competence" internally (less radical but still not what the Treaty requires). The reason for the confusion is that the Court is not clear whether the sentence beginning "Moreover" is a necessary precondition for the creation of external competence in this case or is just a happy fact that the Court can emphasise to reinforce the correctness of awarding external competence to the EU.
b) Existence of Exclusive External Competence for the EU to declare the acceptance of 3 rd States acceding to the Hague Child Abduction Convention
The Court immediately goes to the relevant Treaty provision on exclusive external competence (Article 3(2) TFEU) in its opening paragraph3 0F 30 on the topic of exclusive external competence. However, it sees Article 3(2) as only a partial statement of exclusive external competence. The Grand Chamber says that the TFEU "specifies the circumstances in which the EU has exclusive external competence" and only 28 When dealing with exclusive external competence the Court decided that the slightly different test in Art 3(2)
TFEU was not met in this case -acceptance of the declaration of accession to the Hague Convention by a third State "is not necessary to enable the EU to exercise its internal competence." (para 70) The test for external competence is the necessity of achieving a Treaty objective rather than the necessity of exercising its internal competence. 29 Emphasis added. Advocate General Sharpston has said that the distinction noted in the text "cannot be right", adds "in particular in Article 3(2)". The reader is left wondering as to where else in the TFEU there is material on exclusive external competence.
In the next paragraph the Court recognises that "it is common ground" that the first two possibilities for exclusive external competence in Article 3(2) TFEU are not applicable in this case and focuses on the final condition in that provision -whether the acceptance of a declaration of accession "may affect common rules or alter their scope".3 1F
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The Grand Chamber then refers back in the next paragraph to its own case law on affecting common rules or altering their scope as originally developed in the ERTA case, subsequent case law are still relevant. The two controversial concepts are "the largely covered area" and "foreseeable future developments". The Court of Justice retains both these features of its preLisbon case law without giving any justification for doing so3 9F 39 after the Treaty makers have used wording that solely reflects the ERTA principle and not any of its subsequent accretions.
(i) Largely Covered Area
The Court in Opinion 1/13 reiterates its case law from Opinion 2/914 0F 40 that "the scope of EU rules may be affected or altered by international commitments where such commitments are concerned with an area which is already covered to a large extent by such rules".4 1F 41 The Court asserts that this concept remains relevant after the Lisbon Treaty in interpreting the last clause of Article 3(2) TFEU contrary to the views of the Council and some Member States. The Grand Chamber does not give any reasons as to why the largely covered area concept is still relevant in an era when the external competence of the EU has been clarified in the Treaty and it is not obvious from the wording of the Treaty that the concept is still relevant. The Court does, however, refer to its very recent judgment in the Council of Europe Broadcasting case where further enlightenment may be sought on this issue. However, the decision of the Grand Chamber in the latter case also deals with this question simply by asserting the continued validity of the Court's case law on the largely covered area with no rationale as to why the case law is still relevant.4 2F 42 The Grand Chamber in the Council of Europe Broadcasting case dismissed arguments to the contrary:
"The above analysis is not affected by the argument of the Council, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the exclusive external competence of the European Union is viewed in a more restrictive manner."4 3F
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The Grand Chamber seems to believe that it is acceptable to reject the arguments in favour of a narrower construction of the last part of Article 3(2) TFEU -focusing on the actual words of the Treaty derived from the ERTA principle and not the additional ideas created by the Court after the ERTA case that cannot be comfortably fitted within the words of the Treaty -by refuting a different argument put forward by the Council and some Governments relating to the effect of Protocol (No 25 the fact that the Member States are anxious to ensure that the exercise of competence in part of an area is not deemed to be the exercise of competence over the whole area. The fact that there is no Protocol on exclusive external competence may be because the Member States felt that it was enough to expressly limit the external competence to cases where the conclusion of an international agreement "may affect common rules or alter their scope".
This condition seems to require that only aspects of the international agreement which have a direct effect on a binding internal EU instrument create exclusive EU external competence. Therefore in relation to parts of an international agreement that are not covered by a binding EU instrument there can be no effects by the former on the latter and therefore no exclusive external competence in relation to those parts of the international agreement (thus leading to a mixed agreement). Something of this idea is evident in Advocate General Sharpston's View in the Council of Europe Broadcasting Case. She did not reject the largely covered area concept in theory.4 5F 45 However, in practice she gave it no weight because she decided that the EU did not have exclusive competence to enter into the proposed Council of Europe Convention because there was at least one area of that Convention which was not covered by the internal EU instrument and therefore that area of the proposed Convention could not have an effect on the EU instrument. to be congratulated for its thorough reasoning even if it errs on the side of finding exclusive external competence by putting the onus of proof on those who are asserting that there is not exclusive competence. Given that the Council of the EU -representing a substantial proportion of the Contracting States to the Council of Europe -was arguing that there could well be protection of pre-broadcast signals in the new Council of Europe Convention that would be achieved without affecting EU law it seems rather unreasonable to describe this as a "hypothetical" possibility.
The fact that the Court retained the largely covered area concept had a material bearing on the outcome of Opinion 1/13. It compared the provisions of the Hague Child Abduction Convention with those of the Brussels IIa Regulation and decided that the latter "cover to a large extent the two procedures governed by the 1980 Hague Convention, namely the procedure concerning the return of children who have been wrongfully removed and the procedure for securing the exercise of access rights."4 8F 48 This led the Court to conclude that: "Thus, the whole of the Convention must be regarded as 45 Ibid at AG View paras 104-110. 46 Ibid at paras 141-145, 153-155 and 166 . In particular the protection of pre-broadcast signals is not covered by EU law. 47 Ibid the Court's judgment at paras 78-103. In particular the Grand Chamber decided that although prebroadcasting signals are not covered by EU law (para 97) one of the "possible" approaches being considered for the Council of Europe Convention, to extend the term "broadcasts" to pre-broadcast signals, "would undeniably be capable of altering in a horizontal manner, the scope of the common EU rules in the area concerned." (para 98) and that any of the other suggested ways of handling pre-broadcast signals suggested to the Court (which would not affect EU law) were "hypothetical" and not relevant due to the lack of evidence that they were being considered for the future Council of Europe Convention (para 99). 48 Opinion 1/13, para 83.
covered by the EU rules."4 9F 49 This is a huge leap given that on one view Brussels IIa does not even largely cover the Hague Convention primarily because Brussels IIa has nothing to say about cases between EU States and non-EU Contracting States to the Hague Convention but also because the whole system of cooperation between Central Authorities in relation to Hague Child Abduction cases is not regulated by the Regulation but rather by the Convention itself. The Brussels IIa Regulation's provision on cooperation between Central Authorities is confined to the Article 11(6)- (8) procedure permitting the courts of the habitual residence of the child immediately before the abduction of the child to insist on the return of the child to that country when the courts of refuge have issued an order under Article 13 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention refusing to return the child. The Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa procedure is not an implementation of the Convention in EU law but rather a wholly new addition created by EU law.
(ii) Foreseeable future developments
This was not a big issue in this case but it is regrettable that the Court continues to argue that it can assess whether or not the EU rules may be affected by the international agreement by considering the "foreseeable future development" of the EU rules. This cannot be consistent with a system of conferred powers. Why should the Court be allowed to restrict the external competence of Member States on the basis of what the Court thinks might be decided in internal EU instruments in the foreseeable future? This can, at best, only be fair where the binding EU instrument has already been agreed and its entry into force is pending. It is amazing to see the kind of speculation resorted to by Advocate General Jääskinen in this case relying on this concept.5 0F
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(iii) The risk that common rules may be affected
The Court's reasoning on the possible effects on Brussels IIa of declaring the acceptance of the accession of third States to the Hague Convention is given in positive terms in paragraphs 85, 88 and 89 of its judgment. In negative terms the Court asserts that the consistency of many of the provisions of the Regulation and the Convention does not mean that there may be no affect of the latter on the former and the fact that the Regulation gives priority to the Regulation over the Convention in Article 60 does not prevent an affect of the latter on the former.5 1F
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The Court's first positive assertion of possible effect of the Convention on the Regulation is stated as follows:
49 Ibid. 50 See Opinion 1/13, AG View at para 100. The Advocate General's very foolish speculation, at para 102, about an adverse effect of accepting third States into the Hague Convention because they will make it harder to agree amendments to the Convention misses the point that the EU cannot prevent third States from acceding to the Convention and from having to consent to amendments to the Convention in a Protocol. 
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The first problem with this paragraph is that the provisions on cooperation between Central Authorities are found in the Convention (Article 7) and not in the Regulation (apart from one tiny point in Article 55(c) which relates to the override provisions in Article 11 of the Regulation that have no equivalent in the Convention and therefore seem to be irrelevant for present purposes) so it is hard to say that the Convention could "affect" the Regulation in relation to cooperation between the authorities of Member
States as it is a matter for these purposes which is exclusively governed by the Convention and not the Regulation.
The second problem is that the Court does not set out in its Opinion what are the examples submitted by the Commission and the European Parliament and neither does the Advocate General in his View.5 5F
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This lack of transparency means that the reader is unable to fully test the veracity of the Court's assertion or, to be more positive, is unable to be convinced by the Court's reasoning because the examples are not given but merely referred to in submissions that are not easy for the reader to find.
It is very difficult to imagine how the cooperation between Central Authorities in relation to intra-EU cases might be affected by the fact that one of the EU Central Authorities involved also has responsibilities in relation to cases with a third State and this point is well made by the Council in its observations as reported by the Court at paragraphs 61 and 62. The Court refers to a scenario where two EU Member States are involved in the same case involving a third State but only one of the EU Member States has accepted the accession of the third State. But how might this have any affect on the Regulation? The Member State that has Convention obligations with the third State will carry out those obligations and the Member State that has no such Convention obligations will not be obliged to do anything. If the issue arises because it is not clear whether the child has been abducted to one or the other of the EU Member States this cannot affect the Regulation. Neither EU Member State will act under the Regulation and one EU Member State will act under the Convention.
Conclusion
The Court of Justice of the European Union has relied too much on assertions and spent too little time giving cogent reasons for those assertions in Opinion 1/13. The Court does not appear to be concerned to convince its readers of the correctness of its decision but seems to be content to ask its readers to trust in dogmatic assertions. In the area of external competence where the sovereign rights of States are at stake and the practical possibilities of the Hague Child Abduction Convention applying between EU States and third States may be limited (given the requirement of unanimity in the Council) the Court should have been much more thorough and careful. The European Union would be more democratic and gain the trust of its citizens more if the Court were to be much more deferential to the intentions of the Treaty makers and pay much more attention to the wording of the Treaty (consistent with its declared acceptance of the principle of conferred powers) rather than to its own case law when that case law is not clearly supported by the wording of the Treaty. 55 The latter merely refers to examples without setting them out, see Opinion 1/13 para 93 and footnote 134 of the AG's View.
